2. The Treaty provisions

The main Treaty provisions governing the free movement of goods are:

- Article 34 TFEU, which relates to intra-EU imports and prohibits ‘quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect’ between Member States;
- Article 35 TFEU, which relates to exports from one Member State to another and similarly prohibits ‘quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect’; and
- Article 36 TFEU, which provides for derogations to the internal market freedoms of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU that are justified on certain specific grounds.

The Treaty chapter on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions between Member States contains, also in Article 37 TFEU, rules on the adjustment of state monopolies of a commercial character. Its role and relation to Articles 34–36 TFEU will be briefly described in Chapter 7 of this guide.

3. The scope of Article 34 TFEU

3.1. General conditions

3.1.1. Non-harmonised area

While Articles 34–36 TFEU laid the groundwork for the general principle of the free movement of goods, they are not the only legal yardstick for measuring the compatibility of national measures with internal market rules. These Treaty articles do not apply when the free movement of a given product is fully harmonised by more specific EU legislation, i.e. especially where the technical specifications of a given product or its conditions of sale are subject to harmonisation by means of directives or regulations adopted by the EU. In some other cases, more specific Treaty rules, such as Article 110 TFEU on tax-related provisions that may hamper the internal market, prevail over the general provisions of Articles 34–36 TFEU.

Where secondary legislation is relevant, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the harmonising provisions and not of those of the Treaty (\(^1\)).

This is due to the fact that harmonising legislation can be understood as substantiating the free movement of goods principle by establishing actual rights and duties to be observed in the case of specific products. Therefore, any problem that is covered by harmonising legislation would have to be analysed in the light of such concrete terms and not according to the broad principles enshrined in the Treaty.

Nevertheless, even after 50 years of dedicated activity on the part of the Community legislator in providing harmonised rules, the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods have not become redundant; their scope is still remarkable. Either certain circumstances and/or products are not harmonised at all or they are only subject to partial harmonisation. In every instance in which harmonising legislation cannot be identified, Articles 34–36 TFEU can be relied on. In this respect the Treaty articles act as a safety net, which guarantees that any obstacle to trade within the internal market can be scrutinised as to its compatibility with EU law.

3.1.2. Meaning of ‘goods’

Articles 34 and 35 TFEU cover all types of imports and exports of goods and products. The range of goods covered is as wide as the range of goods in existence, so long as they have economic value: ‘by goods, within the meaning of the ... Treaty, there must be understood products which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions’ (\(^2\)).

In its rulings the Court of Justice has clarified on several occasions the proper designation of a particular product. Works of art must be seen as goods (\(^3\)). Coins which are no longer in circulation as currency would equally fall under the definition of goods, as would bank notes and bearer cheques (\(^4\)), although donations in kind would not (\(^5\)). Waste is to be regarded as goods.

\(^1\) Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz [2004] ECR I-11763, paragraph 53.
\(^2\) Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423.
\(^3\) Case 7/78 Thompson [1978] ECR 2247.
even when it is non-recyclable, but the subject of a commercial transaction. Electricity (’) and natural gas (’) count as goods, but television signals (’) do not.

The latter example underlines the fact that it can be legally important to draw a distinction between goods and services. While fish are certainly goods, fishing rights and angling permits are not covered by the free movement of goods principle, but constitute the ‘provision of a service’ within the meaning of the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom to provide services (‘). The cross-border requirement may also be fulfilled if the product is merely transiting the Member State in question. The Court has made it clear that the free movement of goods entails the existence of a general principle of free transit of goods within the EU (‘).

Irrespective of the place where they are originally manufactured inside or outside the internal market, all goods, once they are in free circulation in the internal market, benefit from the principle of free movement.

3.1.4. ADDRESSEES

Articles 34–36 TFEU deal with measures taken by the Member States. In this context, however, ‘Member States’ has been interpreted broadly to include all the authorities of a country, be they central authorities, the authorities of a federal state or any other territorial authorities (”). The requirements laid down by these articles apply equally to law-making, judicial or administrative bodies of a Member State (”). This evidently covers measures taken by all bodies established under public law as ‘public bodies’. The mere fact that a body is established under private law does not prevent the measures it takes from being attributable to the state. Indeed, the Court held that:

- measures taken by a professional body which has been granted regulatory and disciplinary powers by national legislation in relation to its profession may fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU (’);
- the activities of bodies established under public law but which are set up by law, mainly financed by the government or a compulsory contribution from undertakings in a certain sector and/or from which members are appointed by the public authorities or supervised by them can be attributed to the state (’).

In a recent case, the Court even seemed to acknowledge that statements made publicly by an official, even though having no legal force, can be attributed to a Member State and constitute an obstacle to the free movement of goods if the addresser of the statements can reasonably suppose, in the given context, that these are positions taken by the official with the authority of his or her office (”).

Although the term ‘Member State’ has been given a broad meaning, it does in general not apply to ‘purely’ private measures, i.e. measures taken by private individuals or companies.

Finally, by virtue of settled case-law, Article 34 TFEU applies also to measures adopted by the EU institutions. With regard to judicial review the EU legislature must, however, be allowed broad discretion. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (”).

3.1.5. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MEASURES

Article 34 TFEU is often characterised as a defence right which can be invoked against national measures creating unjustified obstacles to cross-border trade. Accordingly, infringements of Article 34 TFEU seem to presuppose activity on the part of a state. In this sense, the measures falling within the scope of Article 34 TFEU consist primarily of binding provisions of Member States’ legislation, but non-binding measures can also constitute a

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(‘’) Case 76/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR 487.
(‘’) Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9971, paragraph 65.
(') Case 454/85 Allen & Hanbury [1988] ECR 1245, paragraph 25; Case C-227/06 Commission v Belgium, not published in the ECR, paragraph 37.
(”’) See Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (Boy, Irish) [1982] ECR 4005; Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977; Case C-227/06 Commission v Belgium, not published in the ECR.
(”) Case C-470/03 AGM-COS MET [2007] ECR I-2749.
breach of Article 34 TFEU (1). An administrative practice can amount to a prohibited obstacle to the free movement of goods provided that this practice is, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature (2).

In view of Member States’ obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (ex Article 10 EC), which require them to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of Treaty obligations and the effet utile of EU law, Article 34 TFEU may under certain circumstances also be infringed by inactivity of a Member State, i.e. in a situation where a Member State refrains from adopting the measures required in order to deal with obstacles to the free movement of goods. The specific obstacle may even emanate from action by private individuals. In Case C-265/95, France was held responsible for actions of national farmers seeking to restrict the import of agricultural goods from neighbouring Member States by interfering lorries transporting these goods and/or by destroying their loads. The non-intervention of national authorities against these acts was considered as infringing Article 34 TFEU, as Member States are obliged to ensure the free movement of products in their territory by taking the measures necessary and appropriate for the purposes of preventing any restriction due to the acts of private individuals (3).

Moreover, Article 34 TFEU may create an obligation of result. This obligation is infringed if a Member State falls short of the objectives due to its inactivity or insufficient activity. In Case C-309/02 that dealt with a German mandatory take-back system for one-way beverage packaging, the Court made the compliance of the deposit system with the free movement of goods principle dependent upon the existence of an operational system in which every producer or distributor can actually participate. Even though the task of setting up the take-back system was left to private undertakings, the Member State was held responsible for the result achieved or not achieved (4).

3.1.6. NO DE MINIMIS RULE

There is no de minimis principle in relation to the articles concerning the free movement of goods. According to long-established case-law, a national measure does not fall outside the scope of the prohibition in Articles 34–35 TFEU merely because the hindrance which it creates is slight and because it is possible for products to be marketed in other ways (5). Therefore a state measure can constitute a prohibited measure having equivalent effect even if:

- it is of relatively minor economic significance;
- it is only applicable on a very limited geographical part of the national territory (6);
- it only affects a limited number of imports/exports or a limited number of economic operators.

Certain national rules have been held to fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU if their restrictive effect on trade between Member States is too uncertain and indirect (7). Nevertheless, this should not be regarded as a de minimis rule.

3.1.7. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION

The obligation to respect the provisions of Article 34 TFEU applies to all Member States of the EU and in certain cases it may also apply to European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible and to overseas territories dependent upon or otherwise associated with a Member State.

With regard to some other countries, the provisions of specific agreements and not those of the TFEU govern trade in goods between these countries and the EU’s Member States. For example, products originating in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway enjoy free movement in the EU by virtue of Article 11 of the EEA Agreement, and industrial products originating in Turkey enjoy free movement in the EU by virtue of Articles 5–7 of Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on the final phase of the customs union (8).

For a detailed account of the territories to which Article 34 TFEU applies, see Annex B to this guide.

3.1.8. QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS

Quantitative restrictions have been defined as measures which amount to a total or partial restraint on imports or goods in transit (9). Examples would include an outright ban or a quota system (10), i.e. quantitative restrictions apply when certain import or export ceilings have been reached. However, only non-tariff quotas are caught by this article, since tariff quotas are covered by Article 30 TFEU.

A quantitative restriction may be based on statutory provisions or may just be an administrative practice. Thus, even a covert or hidden quota system will be caught by Article 34 TFEU.

3.1.9. MEASURES OF EQUIVALENT EFFECT

The term ‘measure having equivalent effect’ is much broader in scope than a quantitative restriction. While it is not easy to draw an exact dividing line between quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect, this is not of much practical importance given that the rules apply in the same way to quantitative restrictions as to measures of equivalent effect.

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(1) Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005; Case C-227/06 Commission v Belgium, not published in the ECR.
(3) Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6599, paragraph 31; see also Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 60, especially on possible justifications (freedom of expression and freedom of assembly).
(7) Case C-69/88 Brantz [1990] ECR I-583; Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter [1993] ECR I-5009; Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453; Case C-464/98 BASF [1999] ECR I-6269. Cf. also Case C-20/03 Burmanje and Others [2005] ECR I-4133 where the Court held that the national rules at issue, which made the itinerant sale of subscriptions to periodicals subject to prior authorisation, in any event have an effect over the marketing of products from other Member States that is too insignificant and uncertain to be regarded as being such as to hinder otherwise interfere with trade between Member States.
In Dassonville, the Court of Justice set out an interpretation on the meaning and scope of measures of equivalent effect (\(^{(*)}\)).

>'All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions.'

This definition has been confirmed in the Court's case-law with minor variations. The term 'trading rules' does not usually appear nowadays, as the Dassonville formula is actually not limited to trading rules but also embraces, for instance, technical regulations.

Directive 70/50/EEC (\(^{1}\)), which formally applied during the Community's transitional period, stated the Commission's intention to catch not only measures which clearly accorded different treatment to domestic and imported goods, but also those which applied to them equally. Subsequently, in the Dassonville case, the Court stressed that the most important element determining whether a national measure is caught under Article 34 TFEU is its effect ('... capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially ...'), therefore the discriminatory aspect of a measure is no longer the deciding factor for Article 34 TFEU. It seemed clear to the Court that not only overtly discriminatory measures could create barriers to trade in products between Member States.

The ruling by the Court in the Cassis de Dijon (\(^{1}\)) case affirmed the previous statements in Directive 70/50/EEC and Dassonville. By acknowledging that there might be differences between the national rules of the Member States and that this could inhibit trade in goods, the Court confirmed that Article 34 TFEU could also catch national measures which applied equally to domestic and imported goods. In this case, Member States could derogate by having recourse not only to Article 36 TFEU but also to the mandatory requirements, a concept which was first enshrined in this ruling.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Article 34 TFEU will apply not only to national measures which discriminate against imported goods, but also to those in which law seem to apply equally between domestic and imported goods, but in practice are more burdensome for imports (this particular burden stems from the fact that the imported goods are in fact required to comply with two sets of rules — one laid down by the Member State of manufacture, and the other by the Member State of importation). These rules are sometimes referred to as 'indistinctly applicable' (see Commission v Italy (\(^{1}\)).

In consequence, and following the Court's ruling in Dassonville and subsequently in Cassis de Dijon, there is no need for any discriminatory element in order for a national measure to be caught under Article 34 TFEU.

3.1.10. SELLING ARRANGEMENTS

Almost 20 years (\(^{1}\)) after Dassonville, the Court found it necessary to point out some limitations to the scope of the term 'measures having equivalent effect' in Article 34 TFEU.

The Court held in Keck and Mithouard (\(^{(*)}\)) that '[o]n view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 34 of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter'. In other words, the origin and intention of re-examining the case-law seems inter alia to have been the need to limit the faw of cases aimed at challenging key pillars of national welfare and social provisions internal to the Member States which were never intended to interfere with free movement (\(^{(*)}\)).

The Court held in Keck and Mithouard, referring to Cassis de Dijon, that 'rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods ... constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 34' (\(^{(*)}\)). Immediately afterwards it held that '[b]y contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment' (\(^{(*)}\)).

Indeed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by goods continue to be treated under Cassis de Dijon and are therefore considered to fall per se within the scope of Article 34 TFEU regardless of whether they also introduce discrimination on the basis of the origin of the products (\(^{(*)}\). By contrast, selling arrangements fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU only under the condition that the party invoking a violation can prove that they introduce discrimination on the basis of the origin of products, either in law or in fact. Discrimination in law occurs when measures are manifestly discriminatory (\(^{(*)}\)). Discrimination in fact, however, is more complex.

It is relatively easier to comprehend what types of measures are concerned with the characteristics of the products than what types of measures constitute selling arrangements. Measures which concern the characteristics of the product could be, for example, measures concerning

\(^{(*)}\) Case 8/74 Dassonville (1974) ECR 837.

\(^{1}\) Directive 70/50/EEC on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty (OJ L 13, 19.1.1970, p. 29).

\(^{1}\) Case 120/78 Revco-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) (1979) ECR 649.

\(^{1}\) Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (2009) ECR I-1519, paragraph 35.


\(^{(*)}\) P. Oliver, Free movement of goods in the European Community, 2003, p. 127; Case C-320/93 Lucien Ortscheidt v Enim-Pharm (1994) ECR I-5243 was arguably such a case.
shape, size, weight, composition, presentation, identification or putting up. Having said that, there are some instances where measures do not appear at first sight to be concerned with the characteristics of the product, but where the Court holds that they are (13). In *Canal Satellile Digital* (14) the question that was referred to the Court was whether the registration procedure in question, which involved the obligation to enter both the operators and their products in an official register, was in breach of Article 34 TFEU. In order to obtain that registration, operators should have undertaken to comply with the technical specifications and obtained a prior technical report drawn up by the national authorities and prior administrative certification, stating that the technical and other requirements have been complied with. The Court concluded that these requirements were in breach of Article 34 TFEU. It pointed out that the need to adapt the products in question to the national rules prevented the abovementioned requirement from being treated as a selling arrangement.

The Court held in *Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos and Carrefour-Marinopoulos* (15) and *Commission v Greece* (16) that national legislation which makes the sale of ‘bake-off’ products subject to the same requirements as those applicable to the full manufacturing and marketing procedure for traditional bread and bakery products is in breach of Article 34 TFEU. The Court reached this conclusion on the basis that the provisions of the national law aim to specify the production conditions for bakery products including ‘bake-off’ products (16). The principal characteristic of ‘bake-off’ products is that they are delivered to sales outlets after the main stages of preparation have been completed. Therefore the requirement of having a flour store, an area for kneading equipment and a solid-fuel store does not take into account the specific nature of these products and entails additional costs. The Court concluded that the legislation in question therefore constitutes a barrier to imports which cannot be regarded as establishing a selling arrangement. Indeed, the Court seems to follow the position of the Advocate General, holding that rules imposing conditions which are part of the production process concern the inherent characteristics of the goods (16).

Another recent ruling of the Court which could be mentioned in this connection is *Commission v Greece on amusement machines* (17). This case concerned Greek law, which prohibited the installation and operation of electrical, electromechanical and electronic games, including recreational games of skill and all computer games, on all public or private premises apart from casinos. The Court’s view was that this Greek law must be held to constitute a breach of Article 34 TFEU. The Court went on to say that this is true even if that law does not prohibit the importation of the products concerned or their placing on the market (17). The Court pointed out that since the law’s entry into force there had been a reduction in the volume of imports of such games from other Member States. However, the Court also held that the importation of games machines actually stopped when that statutory prohibition came into force. This last remark by the Court could be a determining factor as to why the measure fell within the scope of Article 34 TFEU.

In the list of selling arrangements the Court includes measures relating to the conditions and methods of marketing (18), measures which relate to the time of the sale of goods (18), measures which relate to the place of the sale of goods or restrictions regarding by whom goods may be sold (18) and measures which relate to price controls (18).

Furthermore, certain procedures/obligations which do not relate to the product or its packaging could be considered as selling arrangements as shown in *Sapod Audic* (19). The national measure at issue in *Sapod Audic* provided that any producer or importer was required to contribute to or organise the disposal of all of their packaging waste. The Court examined the compatibility of this measure with Article 34 TFEU in the case where it only imposed ‘a general obligation to identify the packaging collected for disposal by an approved undertaking’ (19). Under this interpretation the Court held that the ‘obligation imposed by that provision did not relate as such to the product or its packaging and therefore did not, of itself, constitute a rule laying down requirements to be met by goods, such as requirements concerning their labelling or packaging’ (19). As a result it reached the conclusion that the provision may be regarded as a selling arrangement.

Measures concerning advertising restrictions are slightly more complicated. The important role of advertising in enabling a product from one Member State to penetrate a new market in another Member State has been recognised by Advocates General (20) and the Court.

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(16) Case C-82/05 Commission v Greece, not published in the ECR.
(18) Advocate General Poirier Maduro’s opinion, at point 16.
(19) Advocate General Vassy Ravo’s opinion, at point 16.
(20) Case C-65/05 Commission v Greece [2006] ECR I-10341.
(27) Ibid., paragraph 71 (emphasis added). If it were to be interpreted as imposing an obligation to apply a mark or label, then the measure would constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of Directive (98/36/EC). In such a case the individual may invoke the failure to make notification of that national provision. It is then for the national court to refuse to apply that provision.
(28) Ibid., paragraph 72.
of Justice (\textsuperscript{14}). Since Keck and Mithouard the Court treats advertising restrictions as selling arrangements (\textsuperscript{16}). It is interesting to note that in certain cases the Court seems to link the scope of the advertising restriction with discrimination. More specifically, it holds that an 'absolute prohibition of advertising the characteristics of a product' (\textsuperscript{17}) could impede market access of products from other Member States more than it impedes access by domestic products, with which the consumers are more familiar (\textsuperscript{18}).

To recapitulate, the Court seems to consider that selling arrangements are measures which are associated with the marketing of the good rather than with the characteristics of the good (\textsuperscript{19}). However, the Court had to qualify the simplicity of the distinction laid down in the Keck and Mithouard judgment (\textsuperscript{20}). Consequently, certain rules which appear to fall into the category of selling arrangements are treated as rules relating to products. Conversely, rules concerning the packaging of products which, following Keck and Mithouard, are prima facie included among the rules which relate to products have, after examining the particularities of the specific case, been categorised as selling arrangements (\textsuperscript{21}). Indeed these solutions demonstrate a certain pragmatism that the Court has adopted in this field.

Finally, in Commission v Italy (\textsuperscript{22}) the Court pointed out that the case-law on Article 34 TFEU reflects the obligations to respect three principles: (a) the principle of non-discrimination; (b) the principle of mutual recognition; and (c) the principle of ensuring free access of Community products to national markets. In paragraph 35 it set out the classic explanation as regards Cassis de Dijon and in paragraph 36 provided the classic explanation as regards Keck and Mithouard. In paragraph 37 it held: 'Consequently, measures adopted by a Member State the object or effect of which is to treat products coming from other Member States less favourably are to be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article [34 TFEU], as are the measures referred to in paragraph 35 of the present judgment. Any other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State is also covered by that concept' (emphasis added). It remains to be seen whether this judgment broadens the scope of Article 34 TFEU, and if so under what circumstances.

3.1.11. Restrictions on Use

One category of restrictions has been highlighted in the Court's case law recently: restrictions on use. Such restrictions are characterised as national rules which allow the sale of a product while restricting its use to a certain extent. Such requirements can include restrictions relating to the purpose or the method of the particular use, the context or time of use, the extent of the use or the types of use. Such measures may inhabit certain circumstances constitute measures having equivalent effect.

There are three recent cases which could be brought under this area of complaint. Firstly, the Commission in Commission v Portugal (\textsuperscript{23}) brought an action against Portugal because a Portuguese law prohibited the affixing of tinted films to the windows of motor vehicles. The Commission claimed that this prohibition was in breach of Article 34 TFEU and could not be justified under Article 36 TFEU. The Commission argued that any potential customers, traders or individuals would not buy such film since they knew that they could not affix it to the window of motor vehicles (\textsuperscript{24}). The Court seems to have accepted this argument. More specifically, it held that '… potential customers, traders or individuals have practically no interest in buying them in the knowledge that affixing such film to the windscreen and windows alongside passenger seats in motor vehicles is prohibited' (\textsuperscript{25}). As a result, it reached the conclusion that Portugal was in breach of its obligations under Article 34 TFEU.

Secondly, the Commission in Commission v Italy (\textsuperscript{26}) asked the Court to find that Italy, by maintaining rules which prohibit motorcycles from towing trailers, had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 34 TFEU. In so far as trailers which were specifically designed to be towed by motorcycles were concerned, the Court held that the possibility for their use other than with motorcycles was very limited (\textsuperscript{27}). Consumers knowing that they were not allowed to use their motorcycle with a trailer specifically designed for it had practically no interest in buying such a trailer. As a result the prohibition in question constituted a breach of Article 34 TFEU. However, in the specific case, the Court found that the measure was justified on the basis of considerations of road safety as a mandatory requirement.

Finally, Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos (\textsuperscript{28}) concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling which raised the question of whether Articles 34 and 36 TFEU precluded Swedish rules on the use of personal watercraft. Under Swedish regulations the use of such craft other than on general navigable waterways and on waters on which the county administrative board had per-

\textsuperscript{14}See, for example, Joined Cases C-34/95 to C-36/95 De Agostini and TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843.
\textsuperscript{16}Case C-239/02 Douwe Egberts [2004] ECR I-7007, paragraph 53.
\textsuperscript{18}See Case C-71/02 Komer [2004] ECR I-3025 (prohibition of reference indicating that goods come from an insolvent estate); Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel [2006] ECR I-2093 (green-stepping situation); and also the similar reasoning in Case C-20/03 Burmaner and Others [2005] ECR I-4133.
\textsuperscript{20}Case C-146/00 Morello [2003] ECR I-9343, paragraph 36. (Advocate General Maduro states that it seems that the requirement to alter the product was imposed only at the last stage of the marketing of the product. As a result the access of the imported product to the national market was not itself an issue.)
\textsuperscript{21}Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519.
\textsuperscript{22}Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR I-2245.
\textsuperscript{23}Paragraph 15.
\textsuperscript{24}Paragraph 33.
\textsuperscript{25}Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519.
\textsuperscript{26}Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519, paragraphs 51 and 55.
\textsuperscript{27}Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, not yet published in the ECR.
mitted the use of personal watercraft was prohibited and punishable by a fine. The Court first repeated the three instances mentioned in Case C-110/05 (Commission v Italy, paragraph 37). The Court explained that, where the national regulations for the designation of navigable waters and waterways have the effect of preventing users of personal watercraft from using them for the specific and inherent purposes for which they were intended or of greatly restricting their use, such regulations have the effect of hindering the access to the domestic market for those goods and therefore constitute measures of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. The Court held that at the material time no waters had been designated as open to navigation by personal watercraft and that the use of personal watercraft was permitted on only general navigable waterways. The Court continued by pointing out that the accused in the main proceedings and the Commission maintained that those waterways were intended for heavy traffic of a commercial nature making the use of personal watercraft dangerous and that in any event the majority of navigable Swedish waters lay outside those waterways (39). As a result, it seems that one could argue that the prohibition in question had the effect of virtually blocking market access. However, the Court in paragraph 39 held that [r]egulations such as those at issue in the main proceedings may, in principle, be regarded as proportionate provided that, first, the competent national authorities are required to adopt such implementing measures, secondly those authorities have actually made use of the powers conferred on them in that regard and designated the waters which satisfy the conditions provided for by the national regulations and, lastly, such measures have been adopted within a reasonable period after the entry into force of those regulations (40). The Court in paragraph 40 held that the national regulations in question might be justified by the aim of protection of the environment provided that the above conditions were complied with. Thus, the Court indicates that the type of regulations in question could be justified provided that the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled.

3.2. The mutual recognition principle

Technical obstacles to the free movement of goods within the EU are still widespread. They occur when national authorities apply national rules that lay down requirements to be met by such products (e.g. relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling and packaging) to products coming from other Member States where they are lawfully produced or marketed. If those rules do not implement secondary EU legislation, they constitute technical obstacles to which Articles 34 and 36 TFEU apply. This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to all products.

Under the principle of mutual recognition (41), different national technical rules continue to coexist within the internal market. The principle means that, notwithstanding technical differences between the various national rules that apply throughout the EU, Member States of destination cannot forbid the sale on their territories of products which are not subject to EU harmonisation and which are lawfully marketed in another Member State, even if they were manufactured according to technical and quality rules different from those that must be met by domestic products. The only exceptions to this principle are restrictions that are justified on the grounds described in Article 36 TFEU (protection of public morality or public security, protection of the health and life of humans, animals or plants, etc.) or on the basis of overriding requirements of general public importance recognised by the case-law of the Court of Justice, and are proportionate to the aim pursued.

Thus, the mutual recognition principle in the non-harmonised area consists of a rule and an exception:

- the general rule that, notwithstanding the existence of a national technical rule in the Member State of destination, products lawfully produced or marketed in another Member State enjoy a basic right to free movement, guaranteed by the TFEU;
- the exception that products lawfully produced or marketed in another Member State do not enjoy this right if the Member State of destination can prove that it is essential to impose its own technical rule on the products concerned based on the reasons outlined in Article 36 TFEU or in the mandatory requirements developed in the Court's jurisprudence and subject to the compliance with the principle of proportionality.

Until very recently, the most important problem for implementation of the mutual recognition principle was without any doubt the general legal uncertainty about the burden of proof. Therefore, the EU adopted Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EC (42).

3.3. Typical trade barriers

Trade barriers take quite different forms and shapes. Sometimes they are very blunt measures specifically targeting imports or allowing preferential treatment of domestic goods, and sometimes they are an unexpected side-effect of general policy decisions. Over past decades some typical categories have emerged from the jurisdiction and the practical application of Articles 34–36 TFEU in infringement procedures. A number of them are described below.

3.3.1. National provisions related to the act of import (import licences, inspections and controls)

National measures which relate directly to the act of import of products from other Member States make imports more cumbersome and are therefore regularly considered as measures having equivalent effect contrary to Article 34 TFEU. The obligation to obtain an import licence before importing goods is a clear example in this respect. Because formal processes of this kind can cause delays, such an obligation infringes Article 34 TFEU even where licences are granted automatically and the Member State concerned does not purport to reserve the right to withhold a licence (43).
Inspections and controls, such as veterinary, sanitary, phytosanitary and other controls, including customs checks on imports (and exports), are considered to be measures having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 34 and 35 respectively (\textsuperscript{43}). Such inspections are likely to make imports or exports more difficult or more costly, as a result of the delays inherent in the inspections and the additional transport costs which the trader may thereby incur.

When the internal market came into being on 1 January 1993, recurrent border controls for the transfer of goods became a thing of the past. Nowadays, Member States may not carry out controls at their borders unless they are part of a general control system that takes place to a similar extent inside the national territory and/or unless they are performed as spot-checks. If, however, such controls irrespective of where they take place amount to a systematic inspection of imported products, they are still considered as measures of equivalent effect (\textsuperscript{44}), which may be justified only exceptionally, if strict conditions are fulfilled.

3.3.2. Obligations to appoint a representative or to provide storage facilities in the importing member state

The obligation for an importer to have a place of business in the Member State of destination was declared by the Court to directly negate the free movement of goods within the internal market. It found, in fact, that by compelling undertakings established in other Member States to incur the cost of establishing a representative in the Member State of import, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for certain undertakings, in particular small or medium-sized enterprises, to enter that Member State's market (\textsuperscript{45}). The obligation to appoint a representative or agent, a secondary establishment or office or storage facilities in the importing Member State would likewise in general be contrary to Article 34 TFEU.

Some Member States have tried to justify these requirements by arguing that they are necessary to ensure proper enforcement of national provisions of public interest, including in some cases criminal liability. The Court has rejected this argument. It held that, although each Member State is entitled to take within its territory appropriate measures in order to ensure the protection of public policy, such measures are justified only if it is established that they are necessary in order to attain legitimate reasons of general interest and that such protection cannot be achieved by means which place less of a restriction on the free movement of goods (\textsuperscript{46}). Thus, the Court held that '[e]ven though criminal penalties may have a deterrent effect as regards the conduct which they sanction, that effect is not guaranteed and, in any event, is not strengthened ... solely by the presence on national territory of a person who may legally represent the manufacturer' (\textsuperscript{47}).

Therefore it was held that the requirement that a representative be established on national territory is not such as to provide, from the point of view of public interest objectives, sufficient additional safeguards to justify an exception to the prohibition contained in Article 34 TFEU.

National requirements regulating the stocking or storage of imported goods may also amount to a violation of Article 34 TFEU if these national measures affect imported goods in a discriminatory manner compared with domestic products. This would include any rules which prohibit, limit or require stocking of imported goods only. A national measure requiring that imported wine-based spirits be stored for at least six months in order to qualify for certain quality designations was held by the Court to constitute a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction (\textsuperscript{48}).

Similar obstacles to trade in goods could be created by any national rules which totally or partially confine the use of stocking facilities to domestic products only, or make the stocking of imported products subject to conditions which are different from those required for domestic products and are more difficult to satisfy. Consequently, a national measure which encouraged the stocking of domestically produced products could create obstacles to the free movement of goods under Article 34 TFEU.

3.3.3. National price controls and reimbursement

Although the Treaty does not contain any specific provision with regard to national regulations on price controls, the Court of Justice has, on a number of occasions, confirmed in its case-law that Article 34 TFEU applies to national price control regulations.

Such regulations cover a number of measures: minimum and maximum prices, price freezes, minimum and maximum profit margins and resale price maintenance.

Minimum prices: A minimum price fixed at a specific amount which, although applicable without distinction to domestic and imported products, can restrict imports by preventing their lower cost price from being reflected in the retail selling price and thus impeding importers from using their competitive advantage, is a measure of equivalent effect contrary to Article 34 TFEU. The consumer cannot take advantage of this price (\textsuperscript{49}). This area is, however, now partly harmonised, and national legislation setting minimum prices for tobacco should for example be assessed in the light of Directive 95/59/EC of 27 November 1995 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the setting of such minimum selling prices is contrary to Article 9(1) of the directive (\textsuperscript{50}).

Maximum prices: Although a maximum price applicable without distinction to domestic products and imported products does not in itself constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, it may have such an effect if it is fixed at a level which makes the sale of the imported product either impossible or more difficult than that of the domestic product (\textsuperscript{51}).

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\textsuperscript{43} Case 4/75 Reue Zentralfinanz (1975) ECR 843.

\textsuperscript{44} Case C-272/95 Deutsches Milch-Kontor II (1997) ECR I-1905.

\textsuperscript{45} Case 155/82 Commission v Belgium (1983) ECR 531, paragraph 7.

\textsuperscript{46} Case 155/82 Commission v Belgium (1983) ECR 531, paragraph 12. See also Case C-12/02 Grilli (2003) ECR I-1585, paragraphs 48 and 49; Case C-193/94 Shanavi and Chrysanthakopoulos (1996) ECR I-929, paragraphs 36 to 39.

\textsuperscript{47} Case 155/82 Commission v Belgium (1983) ECR 531, paragraph 15.

\textsuperscript{48} Case 13/78 Eggers (1978) ECR 1935.

\textsuperscript{49} Case 231/83 Gallet (1985) ECR 305; Case 82/77 Von Tiggelen (1978) ECR 25.


\textsuperscript{51} Case 65/75 Tacca (1976) ECR 291; Joined Cases 88/75 to 90/75 JADAM (1976) ECR 323; Case 181/82 Rousseau (1983) ECR 3849; Case 13/77 GB-Inno v ATAB (1977) ECR 2115.
Price freezes: In a case relating to a national regulation requiring all price increases to be notified to the authorities at least two months before they take effect, the Court has confirmed that price freezes which are applicable equally to national products and to imported products do not amount in themselves to a measure having an equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. They may, however, produce such an effect de facto if prices are at such a level that the marketing of imported products becomes either impossible or more difficult than the marketing of domestic products (\(^a\)). This will be the case if importers can market imported products only at a loss.

**Minimum and maximum profit margins** set at a specific amount rather than as a percentage of the cost price do not constitute a measure of equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU. The same applies to a fixed retail profit margin, which is a proportion of the retail price freely determined by the manufacturer, at least when it constitutes adequate remuneration for the retailer. In contrast, a maximum profit margin which is fixed at a single amount applicable both to domestic products and to imports and which falls to make allowance for the cost of importation is caught by Article 34 TFEU (\(^b\)).

Since the judgment of the Court in Keck and Mithouard, which concerned French legislation prohibiting resale at a loss, it appears that national price control regulations come within the concept of 'selling arrangements'. In this respect, they fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU if they apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and if they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States. The fact that 'price controls' constitute 'selling arrangements' is confirmed in the judgment of the Court in the Belgapom case, where the Belgian legislation prohibiting sales at a loss and sales yielding only a very low profit margin was held to fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU.

**Reimbursement of medicinal products:** According to the general rule, EU law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems (\(^c\)); and, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, the laws of each Member State determine the circumstances in which social security benefits are granted. However, those laws may affect the marketing possibilities and in turn may influence the scope for importation. It follows that a national decision on reimbursement of pharmaceuticals may have a negative impact on their importation and may constitute an obstacle to the free movement of goods.

Furthermore, it follows from the Duphar judgment that provisions of national legislation governing the reimbursement of medical devices within the framework of the national healthcare scheme are compatible with Article 34 TFEU if determination of the products subject to reimbursement and those which are excluded involves no discrimination regarding the origin of the products and is carried out on the basis of objective and verifiable criteria. It should, moreover, be possible to amend the list of reimbursed products whenever compliance with the specified criteria so requires. The 'objective and verifiable criteria' referred to by the Court may concern the existence on the market of other, less expensive products having the same therapeutic effect, the fact that the items in question are freely marketed without the need for any medical prescription, or the fact that products are excluded from reimbursement for reasons of a pharmacotherapeutic nature justified by the protection of public health.

Procedural rules for establishing national reimbursement decisions were specified by Directive 89/105/EC relating to the transparency of measures regulating the prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance systems. In the Decker case (\(^d\)), the Court found that national rules, under which reimbursement of the cost of medical products is subject to prior authorisation by the competent institution of a Member State when products are purchased in another Member State, constitute a restriction on the free movement of goods within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU, since they encourage insured persons to purchase those products in their home Member State rather than in another Member State, and are thus liable to curb the import of products in other Member States.

### 3.3.4. National Bans on specific Products/Substances

A ban on the marketing of a specific product or substance is the most restrictive measure a Member State can adopt from a free movement of goods perspective. The majority of goods targeted by national bans are foodstuffs (\(^e\)), including vitamins and other food supplements, and chemical substances (\(^f\)).

The justifications most often invoked by Member States for these stringent measures are the protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants according to Article 36 TFEU, and the mandatory requirements developed by the Court case-law, such as the protection of the environment. These justificatory grounds are often combined. The Member State imposing a national ban on a product/substance has to show that the measure is necessary and, where appropriate, that the marketing of the products in question poses a serious risk to public health and that those rules are in conformity with the principle of proportionality. This includes providing the relevant evidence, such as technical, scientific, statistical and nutritional data, and all other relevant information (\(^g\)).

Moreover, a Member State bears the burden of proof that the stated aim cannot be achieved by any other means that has a less restrictive effect on intra-EU trade between the Member States (\(^h\)). For example, in relation to a French ban on the addition to beverages of caffeine above a certain limit, the Court held that 'appropriate labelling, informing consumers about the nature, the ingredients and the characteristics of fortified products, can enable consumers who risk excessive consumption of a nutrient added to those products to decide for themselves whether to use them' (\(^i\)). Hence, the Court found that the ban on the addition of

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(\(^g\)) Case C-270/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-1559.
(\(^h\)) Case 104/75 Dr Peiper [1976] ECR 613.
(\(^i\)) Case C-24/00 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-1277, paragraph 75.
caffeine above a certain limit was not necessary in order to achieve the aim of consumer protection.

The Danish vitamins case (\textsuperscript{5}) concerned the Danish administrative practice of prohibiting the enrichment of foodstuffs with vitamins and minerals if it could not be shown that such enrichment met a need of Denmark's population. The Court initially agreed that it was for Denmark itself to decide on its intended level of protection of human health and life, bearing in mind the principle of proportionality. The Court remarked, however, that Denmark’s authorities had the burden of proving 'to show in each case, in the light of national nutritional habits and in the light of the results of international scientific research, that their rules are necessary to give effective protection to the interests referred to in that provision and, in particular, that the marketing of the products in question poses a real risk to public health' (\textsuperscript{6}). After having assessed the Danish administrative practice at issue, the Court concluded that the measure 'does not enable Community law to be observed in regard to the identification and assessment of a real risk to public health, which requires a detailed assessment, case by case, of the effects which the addition of the minerals and vitamins in question could entail' (\textsuperscript{7}).

In general, the Court has taken a restrictive approach to measures of this kind. However, in areas where there is no scientific certainty of a specific product's or substance's impact on, for example, public health or the environment, it has proved more difficult for the Court to reject such bans (\textsuperscript{8}). In these cases, the so-called precautionary principle (\textsuperscript{9}) also plays an important role in the Court's overall assessment of the case.

It may also happen that Member States, instead of an outright ban, simply require a prior authorisation, in the interest of substances which have been authorised in another Member State. In this case, Member States only comply with their obligations under EU law if those procedures are accessible and can be completed within a reasonable time and if the banning of a product can be challenged before the courts. This procedure must be expressly provided for in a measure of general application which is binding on the national authorities. The characteristics of this 'simplified procedure' were established by the Court in Case C-344/90 (\textsuperscript{10}).

### 3.3.5. Type-Approval

Type-approval requirements predefine the regulatory, technical and safety conditions a product has to fulfil. Accordingly, type-approval is not confined to a particular industry, since such requirements exist for products as diverse as marine equipment, mobile phones, passenger cars and medical equipment.

Generally, type-approval is required before a product is allowed to be placed on the market. Compliance with type-approval requirements is often denoted by a marking on the product. The CE marking, for example, confirms compliance with such requirements either by means of a manufacturer's self-declaration or a third-party certification.

While common Europe-wide type-approval requirements normally facilitate the marketing of products in the internal market, national type-approval in non-harmonised areas tends to create barriers to trade in goods. Diverging product standards make it difficult for manufacturers to market the same product in different Member States or may well lead to higher compliance costs. Obligations requiring national type-approval prior to the placing of products on the market are therefore to be seen as measures having equivalent effect (\textsuperscript{11}).

Whilst a Member State may for health or safety reasons be entitled to require a product which has already received approval in another Member State to undergo a fresh procedure of examination and approval, the Member State of import must take account of tests or controls carried out in the exporting Member State(s) providing equivalent guarantees (\textsuperscript{12}).

In Commission v Portugal (\textsuperscript{13}) an undertaking had been refused the required authorisation by the supervising body for the installation of imported polyethylene pipes, on the grounds that such pipes had not been approved by the national testing body. The certificates the undertaking held, which were issued by an Italian testing institute, were not recognised. The Court held that authorities (in this case, Portuguese) are required to take account of certificates issued by the certification bodies of another Member State, especially if those bodies are authorised by the Member State for this purpose. In so far as the Portuguese authorities did not have sufficient information to verify the certificates in question, they could have obtained that information from the exporting Member State's authorities. A proactive approach on the part of the national body to which an application is made for approval of a product or recognition is required.

### 3.3.6. Authorisation Procedure

National systems subjecting the marketing of goods to prior authorisation restrict access to the market of the importing Member State and must therefore be regarded as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (\textsuperscript{14}). The Court of Justice has set a number of conditions under which such prior authorisation might be justified (\textsuperscript{15}).

- It must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance to the undertakings concerned, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily.

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\textsuperscript{5} Case C-192/01 Commission v Denmark (Danish vitamins) [2003] ECR I-9693.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., paragraph 46.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., paragraph 56.
\textsuperscript{9} See further, Section 6.1.2.
\textsuperscript{11} Case C-21/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1355.
\textsuperscript{12} Case C-455/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-12023.
\textsuperscript{13} Case C-432/03 Commission v Portugal [2005] ECR I-3665.
\textsuperscript{14} See, for instance, Case C-254/05 Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I-4269; Case C-432/03 Commission v Portugal [2005] ECR I-9665, paragraph 41; Case C-249/07 Commission v Netherlands, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 26.

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It should not essentially duplicate controls which have already been carried out in the context of other procedures, either in the same Member State or in another Member State.

A prior authorisation procedure will be necessary only where subsequent control must be regarded as being too late to be genuinely effective and to enable it to achieve the aim pursued.

The procedure should not, on account of its duration and the disproportionate costs to which it gives rise, be such as to deter the operators concerned from pursuing their business plan.

3.3.7. TECHNICAL REGULATIONS CONTAINING REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE PRESENTATION OF GOODS (WEIGHT, COMPOSITION, PRESENTATION, LABELLING, FORM, SIZE, PACKAGING)

Requirements to be met by imported products as regards shape, size, weight composition, presentation, identification or putting up may force manufacturers and importers to adapt the products in question to the rules in force in the Member State in which they are marketed, for example by altering the labelling of imported products (199). Given that such requirements as to the presentation of the goods are directly interlinked with the product itself, they are not considered to be selling arrangements, but as measures having equivalent effect according to Article 34 TFEU.

The following measures, for example, have been deemed contrary to Article 34 TFEU:

- a requirement for margarine to be sold in cubic packaging to distinguish it from butter (199);
- a prohibition by a Member State on the marketing of articles made from precious metals without the requisite (official national) hallmarks (199);
- a prohibition on the marketing of videos and DVDs sold by mail order and over the Internet which do not bear an age-limit label corresponding to a classification decision from a higher regional authority or a national self-regulation body (199).

3.3.8. ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS

On many occasions before Keck and Mithouard, the Court held that national measures imposing advertising restrictions were covered by Article 34 TFEU. One such case was Gothoek (Case 286/81) concerning a ban on offering or giving free gifts, for sales promotion purposes. It held that legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising and certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing opportunities for the imported products (199).

Since Keck and Mithouard, the Court has in some respects appeared to adopt a different approach (regarding treating advertising restrictions as selling arrangements), but in other respects both Advocates General and the Court follow and elaborate on the same approach (regarding the intrinsic importance of advertising to the free movement of goods). As explained above under Keck and Mithouard, 'rules that lay down requirements to be met by goods' continue to be treated under Cassis de Dijon and are therefore considered to fall per se within the scope of Article 34 TFEU without any need to determine whether they are also discriminatory (199), whereas selling arrangements are subject to a discrimination test. However, as Advocate General Maduro pointed out, the Court had to clarify the simplicity of the distinction laid down in the Keck and Mithouard judgment (199). Consequently, certain rules which appear to fall into the category of selling arrangements are treated as rules relating to products. This is true in particular of measures relating to advertising where it appears that they affect the conditions which the goods must meet (199). However, the more usual approach followed by the Court since Keck and Mithouard has been based on the foundation that restrictions to advertising and promotion are to be considered as 'selling arrangements' (199) and, if non-discriminatory, would fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU.

The approach of the Court in advertising cases seems to be based on three main steps. Firstly, it holds that certain methods of promoting the sale of a product are selling arrangements. Secondly, it proceeds to examine the scope of the advertising restriction (whether outright prohibition or not). Thirdly, it proceeds to examine discrimination (whether the national restriction in question affects the marketing of goods from other Member States differently from that of domestic goods). In a number of cases the Court seems to link the scope of the restriction (total or partial) with discrimination. In other words, if the restriction is total, it is presumed that it could have a greater impact on imported products (199) and, if partial, that it could be affecting domestic and imported products in the same way (199). However, it should be stressed that the Court in Dior (199) and Gourmet International

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(199) Case C-246/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-503; in this judgment the trade barriers were, however, considered justified for reasons of the protection of minors.


(199) In this context see Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795; Joined Cases C-34/95 to C-36/95 De Agostini and TV Shop [1997] ECR I-3843; and Case C-239/02 Douwe Egberts [2004] ECR I-7007 (prohibiting references to 'slimming' and medica recommendations, attestations, declarations or statements of approval).

(199) In this context see Case C-292/92 Huïnermund and Others [1993] ECR I-6787 and Case C-71/02 Kanner [2004] ECR I-3025 (prohibiting references to the fact that goods come from an insalubr estate).

Products (\textsuperscript{19}) indicated that some advertising bans might not necessarily impact more strongly on imports (\textsuperscript{19}).

3.3.9. DEPOSIT OBLIGATIONS

Deposit-and-return systems, especially in the beverages sector, have given rise to continued discussions in the light of environmental legislation and internal market rules in past years. For market operators engaged in several Member States, such systems often make it impossible to sell the same product in the same packaging in several Member States. Instead, producers or importers are required to adapt the packaging to the needs of each individual Member State, which usually leads to additional costs. Accordingly, these measures have impact on the product itself and not only on the specific selling arrangement. The effect of such systems, i.e. the partition of markets, often runs counter to the idea of a truly internal market. Therefore, national requirements in this sense may be considered as a barrier to trade under Article 34 TFEU.

Despite being qualified as a trade barrier, they may be justified, for example, by reasons relating to protection of the environment. In two judgments on the German mandatory deposit system for non-reusable beverage packaging, the Court of Justice confirmed that, as EU law stands, Member States are entitled to choose between a deposit-and-return system, a global packaging-collection system or a combination of the two systems (\textsuperscript{19}). Where a Member State opts for a deposit-and-return system, certain conditions have to be met in order for the system to comply with the provisions of Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste and with Articles 34–36 TFEU. The Member State must, for example, ensure that the system is fully operational, covers the whole territory and is open to every producer or distributor in a non-discriminatory manner. In addition, a sufficient transitional period must be granted to allow producers and distributors to adapt to new requirements, so that a smooth functioning of the system can be guaranteed.

In Case 302/86 (\textsuperscript{19}), the Court analysed a deposit-and-return system for beer and soft drink containers introduced by Denmark, whereby in principle only the authorised standardised containers could be used. While the Court upheld the deposit-and-return system as it was deemed to be an indispensable element of a system intended to ensure the reuse of containers and therefore necessary to achieve the environmental objectives, it considered both the limitation to standardised containers and the authorisation requirement as disproportionate.

3.3.10. INDICATIONS OF ORIGIN, QUALITY MARKS, INCITEMENT TO BUY NATIONAL PRODUCTS

As a general rule, a state-imposed obligation to make a declaration of origin constitutes a measure of equivalent effect contrary to Article 34 TFEU. In cases where Member States themselves run or support a promotional campaign involving quality/origin labelling, the Court has ruled that such schemes have, at least potentially, restrictive effects on the free movement of goods between Member States. Such a scheme, set up in order to promote the distribution of some products made in a certain country or region and for which the advertising message underlines the origin of the relevant products, may encourage consumers to buy such products to the exclusion of imported products (\textsuperscript{19}). The same rule applies in the case of markings which establish not the country of production but the conformity of the product with national standards (\textsuperscript{19}).

A Member State’s rules on origin/quality marking might be acceptable if the product concerned does in fact possess qualities and characteristics which are due to the fact that it originated in a specific geographical area (\textsuperscript{19}), or if the origin indicates a special place in the tradition of the region in question (\textsuperscript{19}). Also, such an obligation may be justified in a case where otherwise consumers might be misled by, for example, the packaging or labelling of the product.

Measures which encourage or give preference to the purchase of domestic products only are measures of equivalent effect under Article 34 TFEU. The most famous case of such incitement to buy national products was Commission v Ireland (\textsuperscript{19}), which involved a large-scale campaign encouraging the purchase of domestic goods rather than imported products. The Court decided that, as the campaign was a clear attempt to reduce the flow of imports, it infringed Article 34 TFEU.

Member States can permit organisations to encourage the purchase of specific types of fruit and vegetables, for example by mentioning their particular properties, even if the varieties are typical of national products, so long as consumers are not being advised to buy domestic goods solely by virtue of their national origin (\textsuperscript{19}).

3.3.11. OBLIGATION TO USE THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE

Language requirements imposed in non-harmonised sectors constitute a barrier to intra-EU trade prohibited by Article 34 TFEU in so far as products coming from other Member States have to be given different labelling involving additional packaging costs (\textsuperscript{19}). This obligation may take many forms in relation to goods: declarations, advertising messages, warranties, technical instructions, instructions on use, etc.

The obligation to use a given language at stages prior to sale to the final consumer cannot be justified on consumer protection grounds, since this type of requirement is not necessary; producers, importers, wholesalers and retailers who are the only persons involved in the handling of the goods will conduct their business

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\textsuperscript{19} Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795.


\textsuperscript{19} Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 4607.

\textsuperscript{19} Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-19777 (‘aus deutschen Landen frisch auf den Tisch’); Case C-6/02 Commission v France [2003] ECR I-2389; Case C-235/03 Commission v Belgium, not published in the ECR.

\textsuperscript{19} Case C-227/06 Commission v Belgium, not published in the ECR.

\textsuperscript{19} Case 12/74 Commission v Germany [1975] ECR 181.


\textsuperscript{19} Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005.

\textsuperscript{19} Case C-222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 4083.

\textsuperscript{19} Case C-33/97 Colim [1999] ECR I-3175.
in the language which they know well, or in which they will be able to obtain the particular information they need.

Sales to the final consumer are a different matter. The difference in approach is understandable, given that — unlike operators, for whom such knowledge goes with their business or who are in a position to obtain the information needed — the consumer cannot be assumed to easily understand the languages of the other Member States.

In its judgment in Case C-366/98 Geoffroy (119), the Court ruled that Article 34 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a national rule from requiring the use of a specific language for the labelling of foodstuffs, without allowing for the possibility of using another language easily understood by purchasers or of ensuring that the purchaser is informed by other means.

The Court stated in Case C-85/94 Piageme (120), concerning determination of a language easily understood by consumers, that various factors may be taken into account, such as ‘the possible similarity of words in different languages, the widespread knowledge amongst the population concerned of more than one language, or the existence of special circumstances such as a wide-ranging advertising campaign or widespread distribution of the product, provided that it can be established that the consumer is given sufficient information’.

It follows from the general principle of proportionality that the Member States may adopt national measures requiring that certain particulars of domestic or imported products be given in a language that is easily understood by the consumer. Furthermore, this national measure must not exclude the possible use of other means of informing consumers, such as designs, symbols and pictograms (121). Finally, and in all circumstances, a measure of that kind must be restricted to the information made mandatory by the Member State concerned and for which the use of means other than translation would not be suitable for providing consumers with the appropriate information. Nevertheless, this principle of proportionality requires a case-by-case approach.

**3.3.12. Restrictions on Distance Selling (Internet Sales, Mail Order, etc.)**

With the advancement of information and communication technologies, goods are now increasingly being traded within the internal market through these channels. Thus, it is not surprising that the role of Article 34 TFEU in Internet transactions involving the transfer of goods from one Member State to another has led to cases before the Court of Justice.

The questions referred to the Court in Deutscher Apothekerverband (122) arose in national proceedings concerning Internet sales of medicinal products for human use in a Member State other than that in which DochMoris was established. German law at that time prohibited the sale by mail order of medicinal products which may be sold only in pharmacies.

The first question referred by the national court was whether Article 34 TFEU is infringed in the event that authorised medicinal products, the sale of which is restricted to pharmacies in the Member State concerned, may not be imported commercially by mail order through pharmacies approved in other Member States in response to an individual order over the Internet.

The Court started by treating this national restriction as a selling arrangement. Under Keck and Mithouard, a selling arrangement would be caught by Article 34 TFEU if it is discriminatory. In determining discrimination the Court points to a connection between the scope of the restrictive measure and discrimination. Firstly, along the lines of De Agostini and TV-Shop (regarding the importance of advertising to the sale of the product in question) (123), the Court mutatis mutandis emphasised the importance of the Internet to the sale of a product. Then it explained how such an outright ban is more of an obstacle to pharmacies outside Germany than those within it and hence the measure is in breach of Article 34 TFEU.

More specifically, the Court held that for pharmacies not established in Germany the Internet provides a more significant way to gain ‘direct access’ to the German market (124). The Court explained that a prohibition which has a greater impact on pharmacies established outside Germany could impede access to the market for products from other Member States more than it impedes access for domestic products.

The Court then examined possible justifications. As regards justifications in relation to non-prescription medicines, the Court held that none of the reasons advanced could provide a valid basis for an absolute prohibition on the sale by mail order of non-prescription medicines.

As regards prescription medicines, the Court first pointed out that the supply of such medicines to the public needs to be more strictly controlled. The Court held that, given the risks attached to the use of these medicines, the need to be able to check effectively the authenticity of doctors’ prescriptions and to ensure that the medicine is handed over to the customer, or to a person to whom its collection has been entrusted by the customer, is such as to justify a prohibition on mail-order sales (125). Furthermore, the Court held that prohibitions may be justified on grounds of the financial balance of the social security system or the integrity of the national health system (126).

**3.3.13. Restrictions on the Importation of Goods for Personal Use**

Article 34 TFEU not only gives enterprises the right to import goods for commercial purposes

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(121) Case C-33/97 Colin [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraphs 41 to 43.
(123) Joined Cases C-34/95 to C-36/95 De Agostini and TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, paragraphs 43 and 44. Advocate General Geelhoed (Case C-239/02 Douwe Egberts [2004] ECR I-7007, point 68) contrasts this reasoning with the reasoning of the Court in Case C-292/92 Hünemund and Others [(1993) ECR I-6787] and Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Spiec [(1995) ECR I-1779]. He argued that the advertising prohibitions in the last two cases were limited in scale. He pointed out that the Court in the last two cases attached importance to the fact that the restrictions in question did not affect the opportunities for other traders to advertise the products concerned by other means. In other words, ‘the function which advertising performed in relation to gaining access to the market for the products concerned remained intact’.
(125) Paragraph 119.
(126) Paragraph 123.
but also entitles individuals to import goods for personal use as shown in Schumacher (19). A private individual in this case ordered for his own personal use a medicinal preparation from France. However, the customs authorities in Germany, where the individual was residing, refused to grant clearance of the product in question. In a referral to the Court of Justice, the national court asked whether legislation which prohibited a private individual from importing for his personal use a medicinal preparation that was authorised in the Member State of importation, was available there without prescription and had been purchased at a pharmacy in another Member State, was contrary to Articles 34 and 36 TFEU. The Court first pointed out that such legislation constituted a breach of Article 34 TFEU. Examining any possible justifications, it held that the measure could not be justified by the protection of public health. It explained that the purchase of medicinal preparations at a pharmacy in another Member State provided a guarantee equivalent to that of a domestic pharmacy. This conclusion was also supported by the fact that the conditions for access to the profession of pharmacist and for the exercise of that profession are regulated by secondary EU law.

However, as shown in Escalier and Bonnarel (20), private individuals who import goods for use on their own property may also be subject to certain obligations also applicable to importers for commercial purposes. In this case criminal proceedings were brought against two individuals who were accused of having in their possession, and intending to use, pesticidal products designed for agricultural use not having a marketing authorisation. The accused submitted that the national authorisation requirements could not be applied to farmers who were importing products not for commercial purposes but for their own purposes. The Court held that Member States are obliged to submit imports of plant protection products into their territory to a procedure of examination, which can take the form of a 'simplified' procedure, the purpose of which is to verify whether a product requires a marketing authorisation or whether it should be treated as already having been authorised in the Member State of importation (21). The Court pointed out that the above principles hold good irrespective of the purpose of importation and, consequently, they are equally applicable to farmers who import products solely for the needs of their farms.

(21) Paragraph 32.
6. Justifications for barriers to trade

6.1. Article 36 TFEU

Article 36 TFEU lists the defences that could be used by Member States to justify national measures that impede cross-border trade: 'The provisions of Articles 34 to 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health or life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property'.

The case-law of the Court additionally provides for so-called mandatory requirements (e.g. environmental protection) on which a Member State may also rely to defend national measures.

The Court of Justice interprets narrowly the list of derogations in Article 36 TFEU, which all relate to non-economic interests (**14**). Moreover, any measure must respect the principle of proportionality. The burden of proof in justifying the measures adopted according to Article 36 TFEU lies with the Member State (**14**), but when a Member State provides convincing justifications it is then for the Commission to show that the measures taken are not appropriate in that particular case (**14**).

Article 36 TFEU cannot be relied on to justify deviations from harmonised EU legislation (**14**). On the other hand, where there is no EU harmonisation, it is up to Member States to define their own levels of protection. In the case of partial harmonisation, the harmonising legislation itself quite often explicitly authorises Member States to maintain or adopt stricter measures provided they are compatible with the Treaty. In such cases the Court will have to evaluate the provisions in question under Article 36 TFEU.

Even if a measure is justifiable under one of the Article 36 TFEU derogations, it must not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. The second part of Article 36 TFEU is designed to avoid abuse on the part of Member States. As the Court has stated, 'the function of the second sentence of Article 36 is to prevent restrictions on trade based on the grounds mentioned in the first sentence from being diverted from their proper purpose and used in such a way as to create discrimination in respect of goods originating in other Member States or indirectly to protect certain national products' (**14**), i.e. to adopt protectionist measures.

6.1.1. Public Morality, Policy and Security

Member States may decide to ban a product on morality grounds. While it is up to each Member State to set the standards enabling goods to comply with national provisions concerning morality, the fact remains that that discretion must be exercised in conformity with the obligations arising under EU law. For example, any prohibition on imports of products the marketing of which is restricted but not prohibited will be discriminatory and in breach of the 'free movement of goods' provisions. Most of the cases where the Court has directly admitted the public morality justification have concerned obscene, indecent articles (**14**), while in other cases where public morality was also invoked, other interlinked justifications were found (public interest in gambling cases (**14**), protection of minors in the case of marking of videos and DVDs (**14**)).

Public policy is interpreted very strictly by the Court of Justice and has rarely succeeded as grounds for a derogation under Article 36 TFEU. For example, it will not succeed if it is intended as a general safeguard clause or only to serve protectionist economic ends. Where an alternative Article 36 TFEU derogation would apply, the Court of Justice tends to use the alternative or public policy justification in conjunction with other possible justifications (**14**). The public policy justification alone was accepted in one exceptional case, where a Member State was restricting the import and export of gold-collectors' coins. The Court held that it was justified on grounds of public policy because it stemmed from the need to protect the right to mint coinage, which is traditionally regarded as involving the fundamental interests of the state (**14**).

Public security justification has been advanced in a specific area, namely the EU energy market, but the decision should be limited to the precise facts and is not of wide applicability. In one such case a Member State ordered petrol

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(**21**) Case C-246/06 Dynamic Mediën [2008] ECR I-505.

(**22**) It has been admitted by the Court that legislation which has as its objective the control of the consumption of alcohol so as to prevent the harmful effects caused to health and society by alcoholic substances, and thus seeks to combat alcohol abuse, reflects health and public policy concerns recognised by Article 36 TFEU; Case C-456/04 Arokainen and Leppik [2006] ECR I-9177, paragraph 24.

importers to purchase up to 35% of their petrol requirements from a national petrol company at prices fixed by the government. The Court of Justice held that the measure was clearly protectionist and constituted a breach of Article 34 TFEU. However, it was held to be justified on the grounds of public security, i.e. for maintaining a viable oil refinery to meet supply in times of crisis. (*25*)

The Court has also accepted the justification on the grounds of public security in cases involving trade in strategically sensitive goods (*26*) and dual use goods (*27*), as "...the risk of serious disturbance in foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations may affect the security of a Member State". In these cases the Court stated that the scope of Article 36 TFEU covers both internal security (e.g. crime detection and prevention and regulation of traffic) and external security (*28*).

6.1.2. Protection of the health and life of humans, animals and plants (precautionary principle)

The Court of Justice has ruled that "the health and life of humans rank first among the property or interests protected by Article 36 and it is for Member States, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection they intend to assure, and in particular how strict the checks to be carried out are to be" (*29*).

In the same ruling the Court stated that national rules or practices do not fall within the exception specified in Article 36 TFEU if the health and life of humans can be as effectively protected by measures which do not restrict intra-EU trade so much.

Protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants is the most popular justification under which Member States usually try to justify obstacles to the free movement of goods. While the Court’s case-law is very extensive in this area, there are some principal rules that have to be observed: the protection of health cannot be invoked if the real purpose of the measure is to protect the domestic market, even though in the absence of harmonisation it is for a Member State to decide on the level of protection; the measures adopted have to be proportionate, i.e. restricted to what is necessary to attain the legitimate aim of protecting public health. Furthermore, measures at issue have to be well-founded — providing relevant evidence, data (technical, scientific, statistical, nutritional) and all other relevant information (*30*).

Application of the precautionary principle: The precautionary principle was first used by the Court of Justice in the National Farmers’ Union and Others case (*31*), even if it was implicitly present in earlier case-law. The Court stated: "where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of rights to human health, the institution may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent". The principle defines the circumstances under which a legislator, whether national, EU or international, can adopt measures to protect consumers against health risks which, given uncertainties at the present state of scientific research, are possibly associated with a product or service.

The Court of Justice has consistently stated that the Member States have to perform a risk assessment before taking precautionary measures under Articles 34 and 36 TFEU (*32*). It appears that the Court in general is content with finding that scientific uncertainty is at hand and, once this has been established, it leaves the Member States or the institutions considerable leeway in deciding on what measures to take (*33*). However, the measures cannot be based on "purely hypothetical considerations" (*34*).

Generally, when Member States wish to maintain or introduce measures to protect health under Article 36 TFEU, the burden of proving the necessity of such measures rests with them (*35*). That this is also the case in situations where the precautionary principle is concerned has been confirmed by the Court of Justice in a number of recent cases (*36*). In its rulings the Court has emphasised that real risks need to be demonstrated in the light of the most recent results of international scientific research. Thus, Member States bear the initial burden of showing that precautionary measures can be taken under Article 36 TFEU. However, Member States do not need to show a definite link between the evidence and the risk; instead it is enough to show that the area in question is surrounded by scientific uncertainty. The EU institutions will then evaluate the case brought by the Member State (*37*).

6.1.3. Protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value

A Member State’s duty to protect its national treasures and patrimony may justify measures which create obstacles to imports or exports.

The exact definition of a 'national treasure' is open to interpretation and although it is clear that such items must possess real 'artistic, historic or archaeological value', it is up to the Member States to determine which items fall within this category. Nevertheless a useful interpretative tool could be Directive 93/7/ECC (*38*), which regulates the return of cultural

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(*) Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727.


(+9) See, for example, Case 227/82 Von Bienenfeld [1983] ECR 3483, paragraph 40, and Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (Reinheitsgebot) [1987] ECR 1227, paragraph 46.


objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State. Although it confirms that it is for Member States to define their national treasures, its provisions and annex may be an interpretative aid where doubt exists. The directive mentions that national treasures could include:

- items listed in the inventories of museums or libraries’ conservation collections;
- pictures, paintings, sculptures;
- books;
- means of transport; and
- archives.

The directive attempts to define which items fall within its scope by referring, in its annex, to characteristics such as the ownership, age and value of the item, but it is clear that there are some more factors which should be taken into consideration when defining a ‘national treasure’, such as an assessment of a contextual nature which takes into consideration the patrimony of the individual Member State. Presumably for this reason, it is made clear that the annex to this directive is ‘not intended to define objects which rank as “national treasures” within the meaning of Article 36 TFEU, but merely categories of object which may be classified as such’.

Directive 93/7/EEC was introduced in conjunction with the abolition of controls at national borders, although it only covers the restitution of goods already unlawfully exported and does not lay down any control measures intended to prevent such unlawful exports. Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 on exports of cultural goods goes a step further by imposing uniform controls on the export of protected goods; however, these only apply to exports to non-member countries (\(^{[32]}\)).

Member States consequently impose different restrictions on the export of antiques and other cultural artefacts, and these restrictions — as well as related administrative procedures, such as the completion of declaration forms and the provision of supporting documents — are generally considered to be justified under Article 36 TFEU. Attempts by Member States to discourage the export of art treasures by the imposition of a tax have, however, not been deemed justifiable since such action constitutes a measure equivalent to a customs tax (Article 30 TFEU) in regard to which Article 36 TFEU cannot be invoked as a justification (\(^{[33]}\)).

6.1.4. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY

The most important types of industrial and commercial property are patents, trade marks and copyright. Two principles can be deduced from the case-law on the compatibility with Articles 34–36 TFEU of the exercise of industrial property rights.

The first principle is that the Treaty does not affect the existence of industrial property rights granted pursuant to the legislation of the Member States. Accordingly, national legislation on the acquisition, transfer and extinction of such rights is lawful. This principle does not apply, however, where there is an element of discrimination in the national rules (\(^{[34]}\)).

The second principle is that an industrial property right is exhausted when a product has been lawfully distributed in the market of a Member State by the owner of the right or with his or her consent. Thereafter the owner of the right may not oppose the importation of the product into any Member State where it was first marketed. This is known as the principle of exhaustion of rights. This principle does not preclude the holders of performing or lending rights from recovering royalties for each performance or rental (\(^{[35]}\)).

Nowadays, however, both of these aspects are mainly covered by harmonised legislation, such as Directive 89/104/EC on trade marks. It should be noted that, apart from patents, trade marks, copyright and design rights, geographical denominations also constitute industrial and commercial property for the purposes of Article 36 TFEU (\(^{[36]}\)).

6.2. Mandatory requirements

In its Cassis de Dijon judgment, the Court of Justice laid down the concept of mandatory requirements as a non-exhaustive list of protected interests in the framework of Article 34 TFEU. In this judgment, the Court stated that these mandatory requirements relate in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.

Mandatory requirements, as developed by the Court in the Cassis de Dijon case, could be invoked only to justify the indistinctly applicable rules. Therefore, grounds other than those covered by Article 36 TFEU may theoretically not be used to justify discriminatory measures. While the Court has found ways to overcome this separation without renouncing its earlier practice (\(^{[37]}\), it is argued that such separation is artificial and the Court is moving towards simplification and treating mandatory requirements in the same way as Article 36 TFEU justifications (\(^{[38]}\)).

6.2.1. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Although protection of the environment is not expressly mentioned in Article 36 TFEU, it has been recognised by the Court as constituting an overriding mandatory requirement. The Court takes the view that ‘... the protection of the environment is “one of the Community’s essential objectives”, which may as such justify certain limitations of the principle of free movement of goods’ (\(^{[39]}\)).

\(^{[33]}\) Case 7/88 Commission v Italy (1986) ECR 423.
\(^{[34]}\) Case C-235/89 Commission v Italy (1992) ECR I-777.
\(^{[37]}\) In Case C-290/90 Commission v Belgium (1992) ECR I-4431 the Court decided that the measure which could be seen as discriminatory was not discriminatory because of the special nature of the subject matter of the case and then allowed the environmental justificaton. In Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria (2005) ECR I-9871 the Court chose to regard a measure as indistinctly applicable instead of indirectly discriminatory.
On grounds of protection of the environment the Court has justified a variety of national measures:

- prohibiting the importation of waste from other Member States (19);
- a deposit-and-return system for containers (20);
- an outright ban on certain chemical substances but which also provides for exceptions when no safer replacement is available (21);
- obliging electricity suppliers to buy all electricity produced from renewable energy sources from within a limited supply area (22).

Protection of the environment is also closely linked to the protection of human life and health (23) and, with advances in science and greater public awareness, is being invoked by Member States with increasing frequency. However, the fact that environmental justifications are invoked more frequently does not signify that the Court always considers this ground to be sufficient to justify any measure whatsoever. Indeed in recent years the Court has confirmed several times that public health and environmental justifications are not always sufficient to inhibit the free movement of goods. In several cases the Court has upheld the Commission’s arguments that the national measures were disproportionate to the aim to be achieved or that there was a lack of evidence to prove the risk claimed (24).

6.2.2. CONSUMER PROTECTION

Certain obstacles to intra-EU trade resulting from disparities between provisions of national law must be accepted in so far as such provisions are applicable to domestic and imported products without distinction and may be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating to consumer protection or fair trading. In order to be permissible, such provisions must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective must not be capable of being achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-EU trade (25). The guiding line in the case-law of the Court is that, where imported products are similar to domestic ones, adequate labelling, which may be required under national legislation, will be sufficient to provide the consumer with the necessary information on the nature of the product. No justification on the grounds of consumer protection is admissible for unnecessarily restrictive measures (26).

6.2.3. OTHER MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS

The Court has from time to time recognised other ‘mandatory requirements’ capable of justifying obstacles to the free movement of goods:

- Improvement of working conditions: While health and safety at work fall under the heading of public health in Article 36 TFEU, the improvement of working conditions constitutes ‘a mandatory requirement’ even in the absence of any health consideration (27).

- Cultural aims (28). In a case relating to French legislation aimed at encouraging the creation of cinematographic works, the Court seemed to acknowledge that the protection of culture may under specific conditions constitute a ‘mandatory requirement’ capable of justifying restrictions on imports or exports.

- Maintenance of press diversity (29): Following a preliminary ruling concerning the Austrian ban on publications offering readers the chance to take part in games for prizes, the Court held that maintenance of press diversity may constitute an overriding requirement justifying a restriction on the free movement of goods. It noted that such diversity helps to safeguard freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU legal order.

- Financial balance of the social security system: Purely economic aims cannot justify an obstacle to the free movement of goods. However, in Case C-120/95 Dekker, concerning the refusal by a Member State to reimburse the cost of a pair of spectacle lenses purchased from an optician established in another Member State, the Court acknowledged that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system might constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier to the free movement of goods.

- Road safety: In several cases, the Court has also acknowledged that road safety constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods (30).

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(23) In some cases the Court seems to have treated environmental protection as part of public health and Article 36 TFEU: see, for example, Case C-67/97 Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033.
(26) Case C-448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663 concerning the French legislation reserving the designation Emmental to a certain category of cheese with rind; Case 261/81 Raub v De Smedt [1982] ECR 3961 concerning the Belgian requirement that margarine be sold in cubes.
(27) In Case 155/86 Orbé [1987] ECR 1993, the Court of Justice stated that the prohibition on night baking was a legitimate economic and social policy decision in a manifestly sensitive sector.
(28) Joined Cases 60/84 and 61/84 Cinémathèque [1985] ECR 2605.
(30) Case C-54/05 Commission v Finland [2007] ECR I-2473, paragraph 40 and case-law cited.
Fight against crime: In a case concerning a Portuguese ban on the affixing of tinted window film on cars (19), the Court found that the fight against crime may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods.

Protection of animal welfare: In Case C-219/07, the Court noted that the protection of animal welfare is a legitimate objective in the public interest. It also stated that the importance of this objective was reflected, in particular, in the adoption by the Member States of the Protocol on the Protection and Welfare of Animals, annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (20).

As mentioned above, the list of mandatory requirements is not exhaustive and the Court might find that other 'mandatory requirements' are capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods.

6.3. Proportionality test

In order to be justified under Article 36 TFEU or one of the mandatory requirements established in the case-law of the Court of Justice, a state measure has to comply with the principle of proportionality (21). The measure in question has to be necessary in order to achieve the declared objective; the objective could not be achieved by less extensive prohibitions or restrictions, or by prohibitions or restrictions having less effect on intra-EU trade.

In other words, the means chosen by the Member States must be confined to what is actually appropriate to safeguard the objective pursued, and must be proportional to the said objective (22).

It should be noted that, in the absence of harmonising rules at European level, the Member States are free to decide on the level of protection which they intend to provide for the legitimate interest pursued. In certain areas (23), the Court has allowed Member States a certain 'margin of discretion' regarding the measures adopted and the level of protection pursued, which may vary from one Member State to another.

Notwithstanding this relative freedom to fix the level of protection pursued, the mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions enacted to that end. Those provisions must be assessed solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the national authorities of the Member State concerned and the level of protection which they are intended to provide (24).

An important element in the analysis of the justification provided by a Member State will therefore be the existence of alternative measures hindering trade less. The Member State has an obligation to opt for the 'less restrictive alternative' and failure to do so will constitute a breach of the proportionality principle. On several occasions, the Court has found that state measures were not proportionate because alternatives were available (25). In this respect, the Member State is also obliged to pursue the stated objectives in a consistent and systematic manner and to avoid any inconsistency between the measures chosen and the measures not chosen (26). In Case C-249/07 the Court detailed, for example, some inconsistencies in the exemption system, which showed the lack of objectivity and the discriminatory nature of the system (27). If a Member State can demonstrate that adopting the alternative measure would have a detrimental effect on other legitimate interests, then this would have to be taken into consideration in the assessment of proportionality (28).

6.4. Burden of proof

It is for the Member State which claims to have a reason justifying a restriction on the free movement of goods to demonstrate specifically the existence of a reason relating to the public interest, the need for the restriction in question and the proportionality of the restriction in relation to the objective pursued. The justification provided by the Member State must be accompanied by appropriate evidence or by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that state, and precise evidence enabling its arguments to be substantiated (29). In this respect, a mere statement that the measure is justified on one of the accepted grounds or the absence of analysis of possible alternatives will be deemed not satisfactory (30). However, the Court has recently noted that the burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could enable that objective to be attained under the same conditions (31).

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(23) It is in particular the case for the objective of protection of health and life of humans, which rank foremost among the assets or interests protected by Article 36 TFEU. This 'margin of discretion' has also been recognised for measures motivated by the necessity to ensure public order, public morality and public security. For examples relating to the public health justification, see Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-14887, paragraph 103 and case-law cited; regarding the public morality justification see Case 34/79 Henr and Darby [1979] ECR 3795 and Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505; regarding measures in relation to alcohol and justification on grounds of public health and public order see Case C-434/04 Ahokainen and Leppik [2006] ECR I-917; regarding measures against gambling and justification on grounds of public morality, policy and security, see Case C-453/05 Commission v Greece [2006] ECR I-10341; regarding measures relating to animal protection, see Case C-219/07 Nationale Raad van Dierenwelzakers en Lieftweers en Andebel [2008] ECR I-4475.
(25) See Case 104/75 De Peijger [1976] ECR 613; Case C-54/05 Commission v Finland [2007] ECR I-2473, paragraph 46; and Case C-297/05 Commission v Netherlands [2007] ECR I-7467, paragraph 79, where the Court details available alternatives to the contested measures.
(27) Case C-249/07 Commission v Netherlands, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 47 to 50.
(30) Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR I-2245, paragraphs 40 to 47.